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This paper outlines Japan’s  short-term money  markets, the conduct  of  the 
daily operations of  the Bank of  Japan, and the theoretical framework behind 
such operations. 
The modi operandi of  monetary policy in recent decades have experienced 
several regime changes. First, from 1960 to the early 197Os, lending by finan- 
cial institutions rather than the money stock was considered the most impor- 
tant variable linking operating variables and the ultimate objectives of mone- 
tary policy. The second period began in the early  1970s when the immediate 
impact of the first oil crisis had dissipated, and ended in the mid-1980s. The 
bank  shifted  its Amphasis from financial institutions’  lending to the money 
stock, especially M,.  It was in July  1978 that the Bank of Japan started pub- 
lishing forecasts of broad money supply developments. Finally, since the mid- 
1980s, M,  + CDs (certificates of  deposit) has not declined gradually as it did 
during the second period, but has continued to grow around 10% per year until 
very recently.  At  the  same time, the prices of  goods  and services have  re- 
mained stable.  I 
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I. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is the recent financial deregulation and inno- 
vation  in  Japan. Another  plausible explanation  lies in  the sharp appreciation of  the yen  since 
October 1985 and the stock market crash of October 1987, which killed inflationary expectations. 
Under the sharp appreciation of the yen and rapid growth of the money supply, a combination of 
stable prices of goods and services (which partly reflected lower prices of  tradable goods) and the 
rapid inflation of land prices (a nontradable factor of production) was observed. See Ito (1991). 
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The Bank of Japan has never committed itself to a certain rate of growth of 
monetary  aggregates  as  an  intermediate  target  and  often  reiterates  that  it 
watches a variety of economic indicators such as interest rates, price indices, 
indicators reflecting  corporate  liquidity  conditions  and the general  business 
outlook, and the yen exchange rate. However, the Bank of Japan’s monetary 
policy always begins with controlling interest rates in short-term money mar- 
kets. Thus, in this paper, I will concentrate on the mechanism for controlling 
the operating targets, that is, short-term interest rates. Neither the relationship 
between the intermediate (or final) and the operating targets nor how the de- 
sired operating targets are chosen by the bank will be discussed. 
In order to control short-term interest rates, central banks are supposed to 
change the level of the monetary base through open-market operations. How- 
ever, it is difficult to apply this textbook explanation to actual market opera- 
tions, especially  in Japan. The reason for this  is as follows. High-powered 
money consists of banks’ reserve deposits in central bank accounts and bank 
notes.  On the one hand, because  the lagged reserve  system was adopted in 
Japan, the demand  for reserves  in a given  month  is predetermined.  On the 
other hand, the demand for bank notes, including vault cash, is quite insensi- 
tive to market interest rates in the short run. Therefore, the aggregate demand 
curve for high-powered money in any month is virtually vertical. In order to 
clear the market for high-powered money, the Bank of Japan has no option but 
to accommodate the demand for required reserves and bank notes. 
Put differently, under the current institutional framework, the Bank of Japan 
is obliged to supply a sufficient amount of high-powered money, at least as a 
monthly average, so that all banks can meet their reserve requirements; hence, 
it will not be able to effect textbook-type operations. 
Of  course, over periods longer than a month, the demand for many com- 
ponents of high-powered money will become more interest elastic. However, 
this  does not  imply  the  possibility  of  short-term  textbook-type operations. 
Interest rate determination  in this kind of market needs an explanation more 
elaborate than the simple textbook story. The one given in this paper empha- 
sizes the role of signals for equilibrium rates transmitted by the Bank of Japan. 
Although the issue of the mechanism of interest rate control may appear to 
be technical,  it has important macroeconomic implications. For example, ac- 
cording to the  interest rate control mechanisms discussed in this paper,  the 
level of short-term  interest rates does not necessarily  depend on the quantity 
of high-powered money or on monetary aggregates. Thus, the validity of em- 
pirical studies that use innovations in the money stock as a proxy for changes 
in the monetary policy stance in Japan must be called into question. 
Section  2.1 is  a  brief  review  of  recent  developments  in  the  short-term 
In such circumstances, the Bank of Japan has gradually corrected its monetary policy stance, 
which had remained very expansionary for several years. In May 1989 the discount rate was raised 
by three-quarters of a percentage point, the first increase since early 1980. 33  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
money market and an explanation of the market’s characteristics.  Section 2.2 
examines the supply and demand of high-powered money in the money mar- 
ket, which is the basic consideration behind the Bank of Japan’s daily opera- 
tions.  This is followed by a detailed discussion of  operating procedures and 
tools and their limitations.  In section 2.3 the relationship  between the daily 
operations of  the Bank of Japan and the formation of overnight interest rates 
is explained, with special attention given to how the bank controls overnight 
rates through accommodative operations.  Section 2.4 deals with the relation- 
ship between overnight rates and longer-term interest rates, and assesses the 
impact of the money market reforms of November 1988. The paper concludes 
with a brief summary and some caveats. 
2.1  Recent Developments in the Short-Term Money Markets 
2.1.1  Money Markets in Japan: the Status Quo 
Short-term money markets in this paper are defined as those in which assets 
have a maturity of  less than one year and are traded by  market participants 
(rather than  through  bilateral  negotiations),  with  the call, bill, bond repur- 
chase (gensaki), certificate of deposit (CD), commercial paper (CP), and trea- 
sury bills and financial bills (TBs, FBs) markets being considered representa- 
tive.* 
As  shown  in  table 2.1, short-term money  markets  in Japan  have  grown 
rapidly in recent years, especially since 1985 (annual rate of growth in 1975- 
85, 11.8%; after 1985, 29.5%), and posted  a total outstanding figure of  80 
trillion yen at the end of  1989. This rapid expansion is the combined result of 
economic growth, the creation of  new money markets stimulated by deregu- 
lation and globalization, and money market reforms promoted by market par- 
ticipants and the Bank of Japan. 
Several  new  short-term money  markets  have  come into  operation  since 
1985: (1) the uncollateralized call market (July 1985); (2) the TB market (Feb- 
ruary 1986); and (3) the CP market (November 1987). 
The main recent reform measures affecting the money markets have been 
(1) reduction of the minimum denomination of  CDs (a gradual lowering from 
500 million yen to 50 million yen); (2) extension of CD maturities (a gradual 
widening from three to six months originally to a two-week- to two-year in- 
terval today); (3) reduction  in the minimum transaction amount for TBs and 
FBs (from 100 million yen to 50 million yen in August  1987, and from 50 
million yen  to 10 million yen in April  1990); and (4) diversification of TB 
maturities (from six months only to three months and six months, September 
1989). 
2. Yen-denominated deposits in Japan’s offshore market and yen-conversion market could also 
be included. In addition, though there is no official data with respect to market size, CD and CP 
gensaki markets may satisfy the definition in this paper. Table 2.1  Money Market Assets Outstanding (end of fiscal year, in 100 million yen) 































































































Source: Short-Term Money Market Study Group (1990). 
aExcluding TB and FB gensaki. 35  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
Meanwhile, practices in the short-term money markets have been reviewed 
extensively, especially since November  1988, by the Bank of Japan and mar- 
ket dealers (see table 2.2). 
2.1.2  Characteristics of Short-Term Money Markets in Japan 
For  historical  and  institutional  reasons, money  markets  in  industrialized 
countries have their own characteristics.  Japan’s money markets are marked 
by the following features. 
First,  the  size  of  the  markets as measured  by  the  ratio  of  outstanding 
amounts of the traded instruments to GNP is relatively  small, though recent 
developments have brought the ratio to GNP closer to that of  the other large 
industrialized countries (see table 2.3).’ 
Second, the size of short-term government paper relative to the total out- 
standing amount of the market is smaller than in the United States (at the end 
of September 1989, 7% in Japan versus 26% in the United States) and closer 
to that  of  the  United  Kingdom and West  Germany.  In  addition, this  ratio 
shows wide month-to-month  fluctuations  in Japan. Though the  amounts  of 
short-term government debt and CP outstanding have recently been increas- 
ing, bank liabilities such as call money, bills, and CDs still dominate Japan’s 
market .4 
2.2  The Short-term Money Markets and Daily Market Operations 
2.2.1  The Surplus or Shortage of  High-powered Money and Market 
Operatians 
The short-term money market is where short-term lending and borrowing 
among various  economic agents (business  firms, central  and  local  govern- 
ments, financial institutions,  etc.) take place. Like the central banks of other 
developed countries, the Bank of Japan implements monetary policy through 
market  operations  aimed at  adjusting  the  aggregate  surplus or shortage  of 
high-powered money  f fund^"^) in short-term money markets. I will discuss 
its operating practices  from two perspectives:  ( 1) the  relationship  between 
the surplus or shortage of high-powered  money  and market operations; and 
(2) daily operating procedures. 
The surplus or shortage of an individual bank arises from various financial 
transactions  such as the settlement of bills  and checks, domestic exchange, 
3. From the end of 1985 to the end of 1988, this ratio went from 9.1 to 17.4% in Japan, 32.0 to 
32.7% in the United States, 32.6 to 25.5% in the United Kingdom, and  17.9 to 18.0% in  West 
Germany. As mentioned earlier, there are no official statistics for either CD or CP gensaki out- 
standing. If such figures were added to the outstanding amounts, the gap in market size between 
Japan and other countries would narrow. 
4. The ratio of bank liabilities to the total amount outstanding in the market decreased from 
80.4% at the end of 1984 to 70.8% at the end of 1989. 
5. In Japan the hypothetical change in aggregate reserves held by  financial institutions if the 
Bank of Japan were not to conduct any operations is called “the surplus or shortage of funds.” 36  Kunio Okina 
~ 
Table 2.2  Money Market Reforms since November 1988 
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Limitations on use of 
uncollateralized call 
loans by  investment 
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collateral for BOJ 
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operations, rotative 
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bond repos 
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1 week-6  months 
Overnight-6  months 
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Results for the day and 
estimates for the 
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Overnight-6  months 
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1132% 
1 week-1  year 
Overnight-1  year 
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Figures for the previous 
day and revised 
estimates for the day: 
Results for the day and 
estimates for the 
following day: 4  P.M. 
Commencement of “roll- 
over” of bill operations 
10 A.M. 
Shinkin banks, foreign 
banks, and some others 
added 
Results for the day and 
estimates for the 
following day: 3 P.M. 
Offered operations of the 
day (recorded services): 
10 A.M. 
Introduced 
Up to 50% of the 
aggregate amount of 
call loans and bills 




From offers to notice of 
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Table 2.2  (continued) 
Item  Before Reform  After Reform 
Aug  Disclosure schemes for  Disclosure of figures  Disclosure of figures 
fund demandisupply  based on increase/  based on surpluses/ 
and market operations  decrease in bank  shortages in the market 
disclosure of difference 
between current reserve 
amount and required 
reserves not satisfied 
bid system 
notes  Commencement of 
Nov  Collateralized call rates  Quotation system  Commencement of offer/ 
Source: Nakao and Horii ( 199  1 ). 
deposit withdrawals, government expenditures,  and so forth. However, if the 
surpluses or shortages among banks are added up, the aggregate net surplus 
or shortage of high-powered money simply corresponds to that of the govern- 
ment sector and the demand for cash (bank notes) by the private sector. 
Since the  interest elasticity  of  the  demand  for high-powered  money  for 
daily settlements is negligibly small, central bank open-market operations are 
essential to establish daily market equilibrium and to avoid volatile  interest 
rate movements. 
This can be confirmed by checking the budget constraints of market partic- 
ipants. Suppose the financial sector consists of m banks, where the simplified 
budget constraint of the ith bank (i = 1, . . . ,  rn) is assumed to be 
(1)  R, = D, -  L, -  C,  + B,, 
where R, = ith bank’s deposits with the Bank of Japan; D, = ith bank’s de- 
posits outstanding; L, = ith bank’s loans outstanding; C, = ith bank’s other 
financial  assets, (if  negative,  other financial  liabilities); and Bt = Bank  of 
Japan lending outstanding to the ith bank. By aggregating over all banks, the 
following budget constraint for the financial sector is attained: 
Next, the simplified budget constraint for thejth agent (j  = 1, . . . ,  k)  in 
the nonfinancial private sector is assumed to be 
(2)  LJ + W, = D, + C,  + NJ + y, 
where LJ = jth agent’s borrowing outstanding; W, = jth agent’s net wealth; 
D,  = jth agent’s deposits  outstanding;  C,  = jth agent’s  financial  assets  (if 
negative, financial liabilities); N, = cash (bank notes) held by thejth agent; 
and V, = jth agent’s real capital. 38  Kunio Okina 
Table 2.3  Money Markets of Some Large Industrialized Countries (end September 
1989) 
Country  Share (%)  Country  Share (%) 
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United States (billion $) 
Federal funds and RPs  178 
CDs‘  396 
CPS  507 
TBs  407 
Bank acceptances  64 
Total  1,551 
Ratio of  total to nominal GNP 
United Kingdom (million f) 
Call  10,913 
Interbank deposits  87,406 
Bills  5,472 
f demonimated CDs  43,556 
f  denominated CP  3,126 
TBs  12,891 
Total  163,364 
















Source: Short-Term Money Market Study Group (1990). 
’Large-denomination time deposits (over $100,000). 
bExcluding TB qnd FB gensaki. 
By aggregation, we have 
(3) 
If  we  ignore, for the sake of  simplicity,  the government sector, then  the 
balance sheet of the private sector can be described as follows. 
After aggregating over the entire private sector, without open-market pur- 
chases of securities by the central bank the net supply of financial assets in the 
private sector is zero; that is, 
(4)  cc,  + CCJ  = 0. 
I  J 
Similarly, 
(5)  CL,  = 2LJ, 
i 
and 39  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
And since net wealth in the economy corresponds to real capital, we have 
(7) 
Putting all these constraints together, we have 
This equation simply shows that, in spite of the existence of various markets, 
the  macroeconomic conditions determining the  quantity  of  high-powered 
money  held  by  the private sector (deposits with the central bank  and bank 
notes) boil down to the budget constraint of  the central bank. That is, in order 
to satisfy the demand for high-powered  money, the Bank of Japan’s lending 
(ZBJ  should equal the demand for banknotes (ZN,)  plus aggregate reserves 
(CR,)  if no market operations are conducted. 
I  I 
, 
In reality, the government sector affects the budget constraint of the Bank 
of Japan, and the Bank of  Japan not only lends but also purchases  financial 
assets. However, these do not affect the fundamental nature of market equilib- 
rium. In fact, daily open-market operations by the Bank of Japan are based on 
a straightforward  extension  of  equation (8), which includes the government 
sector and is expressed with flow variables: 
(8‘)  AR  = AB -k  AG - AN, 
where  AR  = increase  in  reserves  held  by  financial  institutions; 
AB  = increase in Bank of Japan credit; AG  = increase in net expenditures 
by the government sector; and AN  = increased bank note issuance. 
Equation (8’) is an identity. However, since the interest elasticity of AG and 
AN  is quite small on a daily basis, these variables can be regarded as exoge- 
nous. AB is a policy variable determined by the Bank of Japan daily, according 
to its desired level of AR.‘j 
Hence, market operations commence from the estimation of the shortage of 
funds (AN - AG). In Japan, since the surplus or shortage fluctuates quite 
widely (figure 2.1 shows the weekly fluctuation in the surplus or shortage of 
funds in Japan and the United States during 1988), the prediction of a surplus 
or shortage plays an important role in conducting appropriate market opera- 
tions. A brief explanation of the Bank of  Japan’s prediction schedule will be 
given, with the reservation that it is often changed following a change in mar- 
ket practice.  The explanation that follows is, in principle, based on the situa- 
tion as of January 1991. 
The monthly surplus or shortage of  funds for the following month, taking 
into account seasonality, business conditions, and information acquired from 
6.  As mentioned later, on the final day of the reserve period the Bank of  Japan must extend 
enough credit to satisfy the aggregate reserve requirement. 40  Kunio Okina 
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Fig. 2.1  Fund markets in the United States and Japan (1988, weekly) 
Source; Short-Term Money Market Study Group (1990). 
market participants  and others, is predicted and announced at the end of the 
current month. These figures may be revised shortly afterward on the basis of 
new information. 
Estimates of daily shortages and surpluses, which are based on the infor- 
mation available at the Bank of Japan's  head office, are announced each day 
around  3  P.M.  On the morning of  the day concerned, revised  estimates  are 41  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
released with details of the bank’s planned  operations.  In  the afternoon the 
figures for government net expenditures and the net demand for bank notes 
are revised, and preliminary figures are published around 3 P.M. 
2.2.2 
The next question is when and how the Bank of Japan enters the market. 
Table 2.4 shows the Bank of Japan’s typical market-operation schedule in Jan- 
uary 1991. There are two focal points during a business day that are especially 
important  for  the  Bank  of  Japan’s  market  operations:  (1) the  bill  clearing 
settlement at 1 P.M.,  and (2) the final settlement at 3 P.M. 
Before noon, call money transactions, mainly overnight, are usually quite 
active, as are various bill transactions. In the early morning, the Bank of Japan 
offers CP and bill operations (for the final settlement of the day) and lending; 
later,  it offers bond,  bill,  and TB operations for the next business  day  and 
after. At  1 P.M.,  bill clearing settlement, domestic exchange settlement, and 
call and bill settlements are carried out. Financial  institutions having insuffi- 
cient reserves for such settlements must raise money by the specified times. 
In Japan there exist intraday call transactions-financial  institutions that do 
not have enough reserves for settlement at 1 P.M.,  but that expect to receive 
funds by 3 P.M.  (final settlement),  for example, utilize  second-half  intraday 
call transactions. After 1 P.M.,  the total surplus or shortage in the market for 
the final settlement gradually becomes known. The Bank of Japan carries out 
its final market adjustment to offset part of  the surplus or shortage of  funds. 
The primary tool for this final operation is Bank of Japan lending to financial 
institutions.’  At 3 P.M., yen-based settlements in categories such as foreign 
exchange and net government expenditures are effected. 
2.2.3 
Schedule of Daily Market Operations 
Bank of Japan Market-Operation Instruments and Their Limitations 
Presently, the Bank of Japan possesses several tools for market operations: 
bill  purchases,  CP purchases,  TB purchases,  FB  sales,  bond  gensaki,  and 
long-term government bond purchases (see tables 2.5 and 2.6). 
These instruments are used for different adjustment purposes. The roles of 
these respective instruments in the 1980s were roughly as follows: 
Bill operations and lending by the Bank of Japan are mainly used to correct 
the daily  surplus or shortage.8 On some occasions, CP operations are em- 
ployed for the same purpose. 
7. In Japan, Bank of Japan lending is considered a primary market operation tool. Such lending 
is not carried out passively, according to the demand of  private banks; rather, it is almost com- 
pletely determined by the Bank of Japan. 
8. Dotsey (1986) and Ueda (chap.  1 in this volume) emphasize that the Bank of  Japan uses 
discount window lending as a tool of “dynamic” operations. Though the weight of  discount win- 
dow lending is substantial,  usually the Bank  of Japan does not consider it a tool for dynamic 
operations. Rather, since Bank of Japan lending involves minimal administrative work, it is con- 
sidered the most convenient tool for final adjustment. 42  Kunio Okina 
Table 2.4  Schedule of Market Operations for January 1991 
Time  Market Transactions 
BOJ 












Offer of bill 
operation for final  Bill  Euroyen 
rox.) 
(Bill clearing and domestic exchange 
settlement) 
il 
15:OO  (Final settlement) 
settlement of the 
day 
Offer of BOJ lending 
Securities purchases 
and gensaki 
(settled the fourth 
business day) 
(settled the third 
business day 
TB purchases 
Revised fund surplus/ 
shortage for the day 
and actual figure for 
the prior day 
Operation plan for the 
day and actual 







(settled the next 
business day) 





shortage for the day 
and prediction for 




operations for the 
day 43  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
Table 2.4  (continued) 
Time  Market Transactions 
BOJ 
BOJ Operations  Announcements 
16:OO 
17:OO 
Offer of FB  Preliminary  I 
operations for the  announcement of 




Source: Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan. 
Notes: While CD and CP transactions  are effected almost simultaneously with Euroyen transactions, 
transactions  tend to be concentrated in the late afternoon for next-day settlement.  Bar graph figures 
indicate the weight of  transactions  normally carried out within the given time span (“guesstimation” 
based on the views of market participants; %). 
Table 2.5  Instruments of Monetary Control 
Instrument  Bank of Japan lending’ 
Commencement  November 1962 
Intervention rate  Official discount rate 
Objectives  Adjusting short-term fund 
shortages/surplus 
Characteristics  BOJ advances to banks 
are made and called 
back solely upon 
the BOJ’s initiative; 
amounts also deter- 
mined by the BOJ. 
This makes BOJ lend- 
ing a very flexible and 
attractive instrument 
for controlling the re- 
serve supply in the 
money market. (From 
the viewpoint of bor- 
rowing banks, they al- 
ways have to anticipate 
that BOJ advances 
might be called back at 
any time.) 
Instrument  Bill operations 
(1) Purchase of 
commercial bills 
Bill operations 
(1) Purchase of commercial bills 
(3) Sale of commercial bills 
June 1972 
Bill rates determined in the 
interbank bill market 
Credit accommodation for short- 
term fund shortages 
The BOJ purchases bills held by 
financial institutions through 
money market dealersb (bill 
terms: 1 week-3  months) 
Different from BOJ lending, in 
that sellers (financial institu- 
tions) do not have to worry 
about repurchases. (The BOJ 
rarely resells bills to others.) 
FB operations 
Sales 
(continued) 44  Kunio Okina 
Table 2.5  (continued) 
(2) Sale of commercial 
bills 
Commencement  August 1971 
Intervention rate  Bill rates or call rates 
determined in the 
interbank bill market 
Objectives  Absorption of short-term 
Characteristics  The BOJ issues bills, 
fund surpluses 
payee being the BOJ 
itself, and sells them to 
money market dealers. 
(1) To the call market 
(term: several days; 
rates: call rates [in this 
case dealers do not 
resell]). 
(2) To the bill market 
(term: 1-3  months; 
rates: bill rates [in this 








Outright purchase of 
bonds 
November 1962 
Rate determined by 
Supply of currency 
auction 
necessary for economic 
growth 





The current operating 
method (in which a 
purchase offer of a 
relatively small size is 
made to a limited 
number of institutions 
chosen by the BOJ on a 
rotation basis) was 
introduced in June 
May  1981 
Bill rates 
Absorption of short-term fund 
surpluses 
(short-term government bills) 
to money market dealers with 
repurchase agreements. 
Dealers resell to financial 
institutions or securities firms; 
which in turn distribute them 
to various banking and 
nonbanking institutions. 
This instrument enables the BOJ 
to intervene in the open 
market directly. Since the 
BOJ is able to manage only 
sales operations, however, 
FB operations are not 
sufficient as a monetary 
control measure. 
The BOJ sells financing bills 
Purchase of bonds with 
repurchase agreement 
December 1987 
Rate determined by auction 
Credit accommodation for short- 
term fund shortages 
The BOJ buys securities (in 
practice, long-term 
government bonds) from 
financial institutions and 
securities companies with 
repurchase agreements. 45  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
Table 2.5  (continued) 
1984 in order to 
mitigate the impact on 
the bond market 
Instrument  CP operations 
Purchases 
Commencement  May 1989 




Control of overnight 
The BOJ purchases CP 
interest rates 
(with due date within 3 
months from operation 






Rate determined by auction 
Credit accommodation for short- 
term fund shortages 
The BOJ purchases securities 
(in practice, TBs or short- 
term government bills) from 
financial institutions or 
securities firms with resale 
agreements. 
Source: Nakao and Horii (1991). 
.'In addition to the types of loans listed here, a limited amount of  lending is available upon request 
(the lending takes the form of discounting eligible commercial bills and import settlement bills). 
bThe  BOJ usually purchases bills issued by financial institutions and those backed by other com- 
mercial bills as collateral. 
Seasonal factors (such as monthly or quarterly  surpluses or shortages) are 
Long-term government bond purchases  are employed to accommodate the 
mainly corrected by FB  and securities gensaki operations. 
demand for money originating from economic growth. 
It should be emphasized again that the role of each operational tool is not 
fixed. Rather, it changes in accordance with changes in the financial environ- 
ment and changes in market pra~tice.~ 
The Bank of Japan has various tools for intervening in the money markets. 
There is criticism that the bank should concentrate instead on operations in a 
core market. In Japan, however, there is neither a core market nor a core op- 
erating tool such as the repurchase market in the United States. 
The primary prerequisites for an operating tool to become a core tool are 
1. The respective market should have sufficient depth. 
2. Operational instruments should be homogeneous. 
3. The administrative  work involved  in the operation  should be minimal 
and same-day settlement ensured. 




1987  1988  1989  September  October  November  December  January 
Surplus or shortage of funds 
Bank notes 
Treasury funds 
Bank of  Japan credit 
Lending 
Commercial bills purchased 
CP purchased 
Sales of  TBs 
Sales of FBs 
Short-term sales of  securities 



























-  57,284 
-  5 1,017 
3,992 








-  1,420 
-  25,162 
-  398 
-  23,193 
3,088 
22,000 
-  3,000 
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-  17,232 
698 











-  6,083 
55,590 











-  19,797 
28,507 
10,000 









-  33,987 
-  14,218 
-  3,000 
3,000 
4,035 
-  9,912 
-3,281 
2,212 
-  21,224 
5,061 I990 
February  March  April  May  June  July  August  September 
Surplus or shortage of funds 
Bank notes 
Treasury funds 
Bank of Japan credit 
Lending 
Commercial bills purchased 
CP purchased 
Sales of TBs 
Sales of FBs 
Short-term sales of securities 





-  4,432 
5,920 
-  6,000 
-  3,000 
-  1,064 
-  14,805 
1,935 
1,886 




-  17,696 
-  7,742 
-  14,000 
-  1,873 
14,813 











-  1,543 
1,663 













-  48,705 
-  25,029 












-  33,594 
1,309 











-  19,891 
-  17,000 
-  5,000 
-  924 
1 1,958 
-  15 
1,967 
-  28,905 
-  16,810 
-5,895 










Source: Bank of Japan (1990). 
Note:  A minus sign indicates the following in each row: row  1 = shortage of  funds; row 2 = increase of notes in circulation;  row 3 = net receipts of the Treasury; 
row 4 = net repayment to the Bank of Japan; rows 5-7  and 9 = net resales by the Bank of Japan; rows 8 and 10 = net sales by the Bank of Japan; row  1  I  = decrease 
of credit; and row  12 = decline in reserves. 48  Kunio Okina 
4. The assets to be acquired should have creditworthiness and liquidity ap- 
propriate for being assets of the central bank.I0 
In light of these four conditions, short-term government bills are potentially 
the  most  suitable tools for money  market  operations.  At present, however, 
there are some difficulties in using government bills as core instruments. In 
Japan, two types of short-term government bills are issued: TBs and FBs. The 
amount of TBs outstanding was about 4 trillion yen as of the end of December 
1989, accounting for only 5.0% of the money market. For the TB market to 
become a core area of operations, expansion of  its volume is essential. How- 
ever,  in light of  the structural change in the money flow,  for example, the 
decline in the total issuance of government bonds, it seems to be difficult to 
increase TB issuances rapidly. 
In order for the short-term government bill market to become the primary 
area of operation, it is necessary to maintain sufficient market size at all times. 
Since the issuance volume of TBs cannot grow very rapidly, a second option 
would be to expand the FB market. FBs are bills issued by the government to 
meet its temporary shortage of funds. FBs outstanding at the end of December 
1989 totaled  28 trillion  yen, more than five times the outstanding  stock of 
TBs. At present, however, FBs are issued through fixed-rate public subscrip- 
tion, where the Bank of Japan underwrites the remaining FBs. In practice, the 
Bank of Japan must underwrite the bulk of  the FBs issued: this means that the 
Bank of Japan cannot purchase FBs before selling them to the private sector. 
Thus, due to the absence of a primary tool of operation, the Bank of Japan 
is at present heavily dependent on lending.12 Introducing a public auction sys- 
tem for the issuance of FBs would change this situation. 
2.3  The Relationship between Market Operations and the Control of 
the Overnight Interest Rate: A Theoretical Interpretation 
2.3.1  The Reserve Requirement System and Market Operations 
Ueda’s paper in this volume criticizes the explanations  (including the one 
in this paper) of  interest rate determination that are given by the staff of  the 
Bank of Japan for all sharing the problem of  relying too much on the special 
10. These four conditions were mentioned by  the Short-Term Money Market Study Group 
(  1990). 
1  I.  There are two other problems: (1) TBs are settled on the third business day; and (2) profit 
gained from the redemption of TBs, as well as other discounted securities, is subject to an  18% 
withholding tax at the time of issuance. This is rarely observed in other countries and may be a 
reason that TBs have not become important yen-denominated assets for nonresidents. 
12. Constraints  with respect to other tools of  operations are (I) CP and bills are issued by 
various private companies. Therefore, their creditworthiness is not homogeneous, and additional 
administrative work is necessary, making them not appropriate as primary tools of operation; and 
(2) long-term government gensaki are subject to a securities transaction tax and are settled on the 
fourth business day. 49  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
features  of  the  current reserve  accounting system. Indeed, the explanation 
given below relies heavily  on the institutional framework  of the present re- 
serve system, though  I  do not  think  it  is an analytical problem. In  fact, if 
institutional features are not taken into account, misleading conclusions will 
result. 
Thus, in order to understand the techniques of the Bank of Japan’s mone- 
tary  policy,  some knowledge of  the reserve requirement  system  in Japan  is 
indispensable. The system requires financial institutions to keep deposits with 
the central bank in certain proportions  to their deposits and other liabilities. 
This system was introduced in  1957, under the Law concerning the Reserve 
Deposit Requirement System, and in 1959 reserve ratios were established for 
each category of  financial institution.13 When the system was introduced  in 
Japan, it was considered to be an instrument that directly affected the liquidity 
position of private banks by changing their reserve requirement ratios. Today, 
however, the Bank of Japan rarely employs this tool to affect monetary condi- 
tions in the economy, April  1981 being the last occasion.  Still, the reserve 
requirement system supplies a basic framework for market operations by the 
Bank of Japan. 
2.3.2 
The Projt-maximizing Behavior of Private Bunks under u Lugged 
Reserve System 
Ordinarily, the reserve requirement system requires commercial institutions 
to maintain deposits in certain proportions to their deposits and other liabili- 
ties  in  non-interlst-bearing accounts at the central  bank.  In  Japan, private 
banks’ required reserves are calculated as the product of  the reserve ratio and 
average deposits outstanding in a calendar month, with the reserve “mainte- 
nance period” beginning on the sixteenth day of that month and ending on the 
fifteenth day of the following month. Therefore, the Japanese reserve require- 
ment system is a mixture of a “lagged  reserve system” and a “contempora- 
neous  reserve  system.” But to understand  its role  in controlling  short-term 
interest rates, it could essentially be viewed as a lagged reserve system. This 
system is more suitable for controlling short-term interest rates than for con- 
trolling reserves. l4 
To  see this, let us consider the mechanism  of  interest rate determination 
under a lagged reserve system. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
maturity of all financial assets is overnight (i.e., the only interest rate in the 
economy is the overnight  rate)  and ignore the existence of  the government 
sector  as  well  as the demand for bank  notes  from the  nonfinancial  private 
13. For details on the introduction of the reserve requirement system in Japan, see the Bank of 
14. This does not imply that a lagged reserve system is essential to interest rate control. This is 
Interest Rate Control under a Lagged Reserve System 
Japan (1985). 
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sector. In reality, both the government’s financial balance and bank note de- 
mand  are interest  rate inelastic  in  the  short run.  In  order to maintain  the 
smooth functioning of the money markets, the Bank of Japan partially accom- 
modates them on a daily basis and completely accommodates them over the 
“maintenance period.” Therefore, neglecting them poses no problem in dis- 
cussing the nature of the lagged reserve system. 
Let us consider the profit-maximizing behavior of private banks before the 
last  day  of  the reserve  maintenance  period. The optimum strategy  for the 
banks  would  be to borrow  from the market  and accumulate  reserves  when 
the interest rate is low, and to become a lender when the interest rate is high. 
Thus, on each business day, banks compare the interest rate for the day and 
the  expected  interest  rate  for  the  remainder  of  the  maintenance  period. 
Through this kind of intertemporal arbitrage, the daily interest rate converges 
to the expected interest rate for the rest of the reserve maintenance period. 
If the daily reserve demand (except on the final day) in a reserve mainte- 
nance period  is perfectly  substitutable,  such arbitrage works completely.  In 
other words, the interest rate elasticity of  daily reserve demand is infinite at 
the level  of  cumulative  required  reserves.  Therefore, the actual quantity  of 
daily reserves supplied by the central bank is not important as such for con- 
trolling the daily equilibrium interest rate. Rather, the market’s expectation of 
future interest rates is the dominant factor in the determination of  the current 
interest rate. In this setup, once the central bank’s ability to control market 
interest rates is established, the expectations of  market participants  are for- 
mulated  around the inferred  target range of  the central bank. Thus, signals 
about the target range of interest rates emanating from the central bank  are 
what actuany determine market rates. 
The ‘Anchor” Rate and the Reserve Market on the Final Day of  the 
Maintenance Period 
The theoretical essence behind the credibility of the central bank is that it is 
the lender (and borrower) of last resort, which is easily understood by looking 
at the reserve market on the final day of a reserve maintenance period. 
On the final day, the demand for reserves will become highly interest inelas- 
tic because financial institutions are obliged to satisfy the reserve requirement. 
In Japan, if a bank fails to meet the reserve requirement, the shortfall is sub- 
ject to a penalty  interest  rate  3.75 percentage  points per  annum above the 
discount rate. Moreover,  since a failure to satisfy the reserve requirement  is 
quite exceptional and is viewed as disgraceful, banks consider the nonpecu- 
niary cost to be more serious. Thus, on the final day, these financial institu- 
tions try to raise funds to satisfy the reserve requirement at any cost. There- 
fore,  if  there  is  an  aggregate  shortage in  the  market,  interest  rates  will 
skyrocket without reaching market equilibrium unless the central bank inter- 
venes in the market as the lender of last resort. 
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will try to lend excess reserves, and the interest rates will drop to zero unless 
the central bank absorbs funds as the borrower of  last resort. 
Hence, with a net surplus or shortage on the final day of  the maintenance 
period, the net supply or demand curve for aggregate private banks’ reserves 
becomes vertical, and therefore  the market  interest rate will be determined 
by  the rate at which  the central bank  supplies or absorbs reserves  from the 
market. 
As mentioned above, however, the central bank has an obligation to supply 
reserves to private banks so that they can meet reserve requirements. There- 
fore, if it cannot choose interest rates (e.g., if lending at a fixed discount rate 
were the only way to supply credit), the interest rate control mechanism men- 
tioned above would not work. But usually central banks have many options 
through which to control interest rates on their credit, the most standard one 
being open-market operations with prices determined by the central bank. The 
Bank of Japan usually utilizes lending for the final adjustment; the expected 
effective rate of  this instrument is also controllable, if necessary. 
For example, lending by the Bank of Japan is calculated according to the 
“both ends-counted method” (a historically typical lending practice in Japan) 
in which a loan of a week is counted as an eight-day loan, that is, the actual 
length of the loan plus one day. If private banks try to exploit a profit oppor- 
tunity by using the discount window on the final day, the Bank of  Japan can 
thus penalize them by asking them to return the funds immediately after the 
final day  of  the maintenance period. This would  raise  the effective cost of 
borrowing from the Bank of Japan to a level significantly above that indicated 
by the official discount  rate. Even if this penalty  is only rarely  utilized,  its 
mere existence is’sufficient to provide the Bank of Japan credibility in the eyes 
of market participants.  l5 
Under the implicit assumption that market participants recognize the strong 
influence of the central bank on interest rates on the final day, the interest rates 
on other days converge to the expected (central bank’s final day target). In this 
setup, private banks try to maximize profits daily, continually bearing in mind 
the expected rate on the final day (the “anchor”), and such behavior is the key 
to formulating the daily rate. This game is repeated every month. The art of 
central  banking here is to transmit  information  about the anchor to market 
participants in an effective way. 
15. Ueda’s paper (chap. 1 in this volume) emphasizes the role of  heavy reliance on discount 
lending for interest rate control under the current framework. He argues that expectations of the 
cancellation of  discount window lending are important. Since the official discount rate is usually 
lower than  market interest rates and since banks rely heavily on discount window lending, this 
could work as an effective punitive deterrent. Theoretically speaking, the structure of this expla- 
nation is quite similar to the “both ends-counted’ story given in this paper. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that, when the final day of the maintenance period comes  just before a weekend, 
it becomes more difficult for the Bank of Japan to control interest rates because the penalty from 
using the “both ends-counted”  rule becomes unfeasible. Therefore,  heavy reliance on discount 
window lending in itself is not a necessary condition for controlling interest rates. 52  Kunio Okina 
Of course, since the maintenance period in Japan is one month, and since 
the daily market rate depends on expected  targets, the overnight rate is not 
perfectly controllable. For example, given a situation in which the yen is rap- 
idly depreciating, market participants may be confident that the Bank of Japan 
will  raise the official discount rate and try to raise short-term interest rates 
within the current maintenance period. This expectation would actually raise 
interest rates, even if  the Bank  of  Japan tried to  transmit  the  signal that  it 
wanted to keep rates at current levels, for example, by supplying reserves. In 
the present world with abundant information, the problem is whether the sig- 
nals transmitted by the central bank can acquire credibility among market par- 
ticipants. l6 
2.3.3  Interest Rate Control under Alternative Reserve Systems 
Length of  the Maintenance Period and the Role of  Defensive Operations 
The importance of  accurate  “defensive  operations”  (operations  aimed to 
offset changes in aggregate reserves) differs just as reserve systems differ. One 
example of a system in which defensive operations are essential is the case of 
Italy before  14 October  1990. Reserve  requirements  were  maintained each 
day of the maintenance period until  14 October 1990; every day was a kind of 
“final day” of the maintenance  period.  As a result, interest rates were quite 
sensitive to the market operations of the Bank of Italy. 
When the Bank of Italy supplied excess reserves,  for example, overnight 
rates dropped to near 0%. Because of these problems, on 15 October 1990 the 
Bank of  Italy shifted its reserve requirement system to a monthly average re- 
quiremint. When there is no reserve requirement system, or when a required 
reserve ratio is quite low and is not a binding constraint on banks, as it was in 
Japan before  1959, the situation is similar to that in Italy because the demand 
for the high-powered  money required for daily settlements cannot be interest 
elastic. Thus, it is not surprising that the nonregulated call rate in Japan before 
1959 was volatile. 
If precise defensive operations are not essential in controlling interest rates 
under the current lagged reserve framework, the question arises why the Bank 
of Japan makes every effort to estimate the shortage or surplus of funds every 
day, as explained earlier. 
My tentative interpretation of  this phenomenon is that the so-called reserve 
progress ratio is used in Japan as a means of signaling the anchor rate to mar- 
ket participants.l8 The reserve progress  ratio is the ratio of reserve deposits 
accumulated from the first day of  a maintenance period to the total cumulative 
reserve  deposits  required  for that  period. Suzuki, Kuroda,  and  Shirakawa 
16. The problem of  consistency  among the signals transmitted by  the central bank  will  be 
17. See Ueda’s paper (chap. 1 in this volume). 
18. For further discussion of this interpretation, see Okina (1987). 
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(1988) argue that the ratio increases by 3.3% a day in a standard path along 
which  required  reserve  deposits  are equally  maintained  every day during a 
given maintenance period. A faster pace would emit a signal of easier, and a 
slower pace tighter, money market control. In order to avoid transmitting con- 
fusing signals, accurate estimation of  the shortage or surplus of funds each 
day would be important. 
Interest Rate Control under a Contemporaneous Reserve System 
So far, I have assumed a pure lagged reserve system. In reality, however, 
the Japanese reserve requirement system is a mixture of a lagged reserve sys- 
tem and a contemporaneous reserve system.  Do I  have to modify  my argu- 
ments about interest rate control if this fact is taken into account? To  answer 
this question, consider the function of the contemporaneous reserve system.  l9 
Under  a lagged reserve  system, the required  reserve  for a given mainte- 
nance period is a predetermined  variable. On the other hand, under a contem- 
poraneous  reserve  system, it has been  argued  that, since private  banks can 
change their deposits by changing lending levels, they can control the level of 
required reserves. Therefore, the central bank need not transmit  signals re- 
garding the target interest rate to market participants. This is why a contem- 
poraneous  reserve  system  is  advocated  when  total  reserve  targeting  is  at- 
tempted. 
Even in the United States, however, where a contemporaneous reserve sys- 
tem has been adopted, reserve demand on the final day of the maintenance 
period is highly interest rate inelastic, and the federal funds rate often shows 
volatile movement on that day. 
Of course, the r'eserve requirement system in the United States is not purely 
contemporaneous.20  But even if  we adopt a purely contemporaneous  reserve 
system, it would  not be easy for the central bank  to avoid affecting interest 
rates directly,  for as the maintenance  period  comes closer to its end, it be- 
comes more difficult for private banks to adjust required reserves. Actually, at 
the very last moment such adjustment should be practically impossible,  and 
the demand for reserves  is  bound  to become highly  interest rate  inelastic. 
Therefore, unless the central bank is willing to accept severe interest rate vol- 
19. One practical problem of a contemporaneous reserve system is the difficulty in calculating 
required reserves. Partly due to this, a contemporaneous system was avoided in Japan. In 1957, 
the Report of the Committee for Financial System Research argued that it was appropriate to have 
some lag between the maintenance period and the period of calculation for cash and deposits, for 
the convenience of  data collection.  As a result,  the  fifteen-day  lag of  the current system was 
decided upon. 
20. Since February 1984, U.S.  depository institutions have been required, on average, to main- 
tain given reserves for over fourteen days. Since the average reserve requirement against transac- 
tion deposits is computed by  using the average over the fourteen days ending two days before the 
end of the maintenance period, and since the relative weight of transaction deposits in the reserve 
requirement calculation is high (reserve requirements against other liabilities are lagged by nearly 
four weeks, compared with those against transaction deposits), the system is usually considered 
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atility, it has no option but to accommodate the demand for reserves,  and in 
that process it will have to reveal its anchor.2’ 
One might argue that private banks could quickly adjust their deposits, by 
repurchasing  CDs, for example. In Japan, however,  the share of CDs in all 
deposits of  private banks is only a few percent, and the required reserve ratio 
for CDs is only 1.75%. Therefore, in order to offset a reserve shortage, the 
required amount of  CD  repurchases would be approximately fifty-seven times 
the initial reserve shortage. Moreover, there is no incentive for a bank with a 
shortage of reserves to repurchase the CDs: such action would reduce the level 
of required reserves for the concerned bank and for the banking system as a 
whole; for the individual bank, however, the outflow of reserves caused by the 
repurchase will be much larger than the reduction in required reserves. Thus, 
CD repurchases may not be a practical solution. 
In sum, even under a contemporaneous reserve requirement  system, the 
central bank may still have to act as a lender (and borrower) of last resort. If 
so, market participants  are very likely to attach great importance to the level 
of interest  rates that they consider the central bank to be targeting,  and the 
techniques of central banking used to guide market rates will be very similar 
to those used under a lagged reserve system. In Japan, although the reserve 
system  is a  mixture of  “two weeks  lagged”  and  “two weeks  contempora- 
neous,” the art of  central banking is intrinsically closer to a pure lagged re- 
serve system. 
Effects  of Carry-over  Options 
Since reserve carry-over is not permitted  in Japan and the Bank of Japan 
would akcommodate any potential shortages during a given maintenance pe- 
riod, private banks have no incentive to hold excess reserves.  Thus, some- 
times it is argued that the absence of carry-over is an important feature of the 
reserve system in Japan.22  However, the carry-over in the reserve system is not 
necessarily essential. The existence of carry-over options in the Japanese re- 
serve requirement system, such as those in the United  States, would have a 
negligible  impact. In the United States, banks are allowed to carry forward 
any deficiency in reserves up to two percentage points of  the reserve require- 
ment, but this deficiency must be made up by holding additional reserves in 
the next maintenance period. Under the current system in the United States, 
this option is used only for technical adjustments made by the bank, and the 
impact of  the federal funds rate on the carry-over amount  is quite limited. 
21. The Fed seems to be relatively less interested in defensive operations.  In fact, it effects 
market operations only once a day, around 11:30  A.M. Therefore, if it misestimated the surplus or 
shortage of funds, it would affect the market rate. However, in the United States, volatile move- 
ments in the federal funds rate are mostly observed on the final day of each maintenance period. 
The implication of this fact is that the importance of defensive operations differs between a usual 
day and the final day. 
22. See Ueda’s paper (chap. 1 in this volume). 55  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
Indeed, in spite of the existence of this carry-over allowance, the federal funds 
rate in the United States shows considerable volatility on the final day of  the 
maintenance period. 
In addition, if the two-percentage-point limit on the carry-over option were 
to be lifted, it would simply mean that the length of  the maintenance period 
would be doubled, becoming two months rather than one. All of this indicates 
that carry-over is not necessarily as important as has sometimes been argued. 
2.3.4  The Equilibrium Overnight Rate in a General Equilibrium Model 
In this paper I concentrate on the determination of  the overnight rate within 
a given one-month maintenance period.  If  I tried to discuss the transmission 
mechanism of  monetary policy from operating targets to intermediate and fi- 
nal targets, I would need to construct a dynamic general equilibrium model 
and accumulate empirical  knowledge  of the parameters  involved.  However, 
the discussion in this paper is not necessarily imperfect just because my anal- 
ysis  is based on a partial  equilibrium setup.  In  what follows, I will briefly 
expand on this point.23 
Consider a dynamic general equilibrium model that includes markets such 
as the high-powered money market, the deposit market, the bank lending mar- 
ket, and the securities market. It might be desirable to include the real sector 
as well, but I omit that sector for the sake of simplicity. The time unit t repre- 
sents one reserve requirement  maintenance period (one month for Japan). In 
this model, interest rates  such as lending and deposit rates should be deter- 
mined  simultaneously.  Equilibrium  in the high-powered  money  market, ig- 
noring the government sector, is given by 
where  R,, = reserves  of  the  ith  bank  at  the  tth  maintenance  period; 
N,,  = demand  for  bank  notes  of  the  jth  nonfinancial  agent  at  t;  and 
B, = credit supplied by the central bank at t. Under a lagged reserve system, 
(9) 
where D,,-, = deposits outstanding  of  the  ith  at (t - 1); y  = reserve re- 
quirement ratio; and R,*  = aggregate required reserve at t. 
Equation  (9) implies that  the reserve demand  at t  is predetermined. The 
demand for bank  notes is both  insensitive to interest  rates  and volatile,  as 
shown in figure 2.1. Thus, if we denote the aggregate demand for bank notes 
at t as N;, 
(10)  NF  = EN,,, 
1 
23.  Iwamura (1992) deals with  a similar problem by  using  a standard general  equilibrium 
model. Ueda (1984) has pursued a related argument. 56  Kunio Okina 
then N,* is almost exogenous. As a result, the central bank must accommodate 
reserve requirements and the demand for bank notes at time t. Namely, 
(1  1)  B, = R,*  + N,, 
which means that the credit supplied by the central bank is determined by the 
predetermined reserve requirement and the exogetlous demand for bank notes. 
Note that these variables are not affected by any variables determined by other 
sectors in the model. Since the demand for reserves is predetermined  and the 
supply  of  reserves  is  accommodative, the equilibrium  interest  rate in  the 
money  market is seemingly  indeterminate. However,  the  central  bank  can 
choose the level of interest rates, as explained earlier. In sum, since R,* and N, 
are predetermined or exogenous and are not simultaneously determined in the 
whole general equilibrium model, the Bank of Japan can guide interest rates 
even if it completely accommodates the demand for high-powered money.24 
2.4  Determination of Longer-Term Market Rates and Money Market 
Reform in Japan 
2.4.1  Longer-Term Interest Rates and Overnight Rates 
So far, I have assumed that  money market  transactions  are only effected 
overnight. In reality, however, there are also other maturities of money market 
transactions. For example, the maturities of transactions in commercial bills 
run from one week to one year.25 
The standard theory of the term structure suggests that longer-term interest 
rates are’ equal to the expected average of overnight rates in the period con- 
cerned plus a risk premium, which  is determined by the market and which 
reflects such factors as the preferred maturity of  market participants,  the de- 
gree of risk aversion, and the expected volatility of overnight rates.26 
If the money market is efficient, it should not be possible for the Bank of 
Japan to effect successfully  a “twist operation”  within  a given maintenance 
period. Suppose the Bank of Japan carries out at the same time an overnight 
CP operation and a one-week bill operation seven days before the final day of 
the maintenance period. Through the latter operation, it may try to transmit a 
signal regarding the average future level of overnight rates during the mainte- 
nance period. Market  participants  will  compare this rate with the overnight 
rate, however, and if the signals conveyed by the overnight CP operation are 
24. Thus, in  constructing a general equilibrium model, we need a reaction  function  that ex- 
plains how the Bank of Japan determines its target level for short-term interest rates.  Regarding 
the reaction function of the Bank of Japan, see Bryant (1991). 
25. In this section, we are mainly concerned with interest rates in short-term money markets. 
However, interest rates on assets with maturities of longer than one year are not excluded from the 
argument, because some empirical analysis suggests that information regarding longer-maturity 
interest rates is more abundant than that for shorter-term rates. 
26. One example of  a recent empirical study of  the term structure in Japan is Campbell and 
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inconsistent  with  those of  the bill  operation, market participants  would  be 
puzzled. If market participants believed that the intention of the Bank of Japan 
was to realize  a different overnight rate on the final day of the maintenance 
period, arbitrage would simply offset the effect of  the CP operation. 
Let us consider the case in which there occurs a “twist operation” that goes 
beyond a particular maintenance period.  Since the  demand for reserves  in 
each of the two periods concerned are not directly linked, it should in prin- 
ciple be possible to have longer-maturity operations reveal the expected future 
anchor without affecting the expected anchor in the current maintenance pe- 
riod.  This kind  of  operation by  the  central  bank  may  sometimes become 
meaningful. But even in this case, market participants would be puzzled, un- 
less the signal included  in each type of operation is established as a market 
practice. 
If  the possibility  of  a “twist  operation” is limited, the central bank  must 
select one maturity from the whole term structure as its operating target. The 
criteria in selecting an operating target are (1) ease of control by the central 
bank; (2) the market information sacrificed by using that particular instrument 
as a target; and (3) its relationship with intermediate  and final targets. If the 
emphasis is placed on the first two criteria, it is natural to select the overnight 
rate as an operating target. In this case, the overnight rate would directly re- 
flect the policy stance of  the central bank. Longer-term interest rates, in turn, 
would reflect  the expected overnight rate formulated by market participants 
based on their expectations of business conditions and monetary policy in the 
future, and would thus provide the central bank with important information 
about market sentiments. 
The framework of interest rate determination would be formulated  by the 
following feedback rule: overnight rates affect longer-term rates via the expec- 
tations of market participants and, observing these rates, the Bank of  Japan 
readjusts overnight rate targets. 
Suppose the Bank of  Japan keeps the overnight rate at an inappropriately 
low level. Theoretically,  it could maintain this situation in any maintenance 
period.  However, doing so would create inflationary expectations and the an- 
ticipation  of  a future increase in overnight  rates (i.e., changes in the future 
policy stance), and interest rates for longer maturities would rise.*’ This rise 
would reflect pressure for a policy change stemming from market participants. 
Thus, although longer-term rates  naturally  have a stronger influence on the 
real economy than do overnight rates, it may not be a good strategy for the 
central bank to choose a longer-term rate as the operating target unless it con- 
tains no useful information and only noise.2s 
27. Nakao and Horii (1991) argue that market rates in Japan are noisy and not a credible indi- 
cator of  future inflation. On the other hand, Kato (1991)  uses a method similar to that of  Mishkin 
(1989) and reports that spreads between short- and long-term interest rates in Japan can perhaps 
suggest the course of future inflation. 
28. Although longer-term interest rates may contain valuable information that could be used in 
formulating monetary policy, a problem in attaching too much importance to them is the possible 58  Kunio Okina 
Of course, from the central bank’s viewpoint, the market may not always 
react appropriately. Market participants sometimes overreact to variables such 
as the exchange rate, stock prices, interest rates abroad, and speeches by gov- 
ernment officials at home and abroad, and they  sometimes misperceive the 
true intentions of the central bank. 
In order to avoid such misunderstanding,  the Bank of Japan manifests its 
policy intentions not only in various market operations but also in many other 
ways. Examples are the governor’s speeches and his press conferences every 
other week, and official comments on statistics compiled by the bank (whole- 
sale prices, the money supply,  the Short-Term Economic  Survey of  Enter- 
prises, or TANKAN). The publication of the Quarterly Review (since 1987 in 
both English and Japanese) is also used as a means of explaining the current 
monetary policy stance.29 
When the central bank transmits various signals, it is important that market 
participants identify the one that is the most fundamental. In Japan, the official 
discount rate is considered to be the most basic signal. Therefore, flexible and 
timely changes in the official discount rate are highly desirable. 
2.4.2 
Until November  1988, the maturity of the bill operations frequently used 
by the Bank of Japan was two to three months. Under this situation, interest 
rate differentials between  bill rates and the Euroyen or CD rates widened in 
the summer of  1988, when the expansion of  the economy  was evident and 
market  participants  expected a future  increase  in  short-term interest  rates. 
Thus, the bulk of money market transactions shifted to outside the bill market. 
Againkt this background, practices in the interbank market were jointly re- 
viewed  in November  1988 by the Bank of Japan as well as market partici- 
pants. One of the major items that came under review was the extension of the 
transaction  period for bills (from a range of one to six months to a range of 
one week to six months; see table 2.2).  With this proposal, the Bank of Japan 
made clear its intention to shorten the maturity  of market  operations,  while 
leaving the formation of long-term rates to market arbitrage, so as to reflect 
the expectations of market participants. As a result of the adoption of these 
reforms, the interest rate differentials between bill rates and Euroyen or CD 
rates disappeared and transaction volume in the bill market was restored,  as 
shown in figure 2.2. One interpretation of  this reform is that it was an attempt 
to use long-term interest rates as an indicator of the state of the economy. 
An Interpretation of Money Market Reforms in 1988 
indeterminacy of  the operating target and the resultant  instability.  Similarly, Dornbusch (1986) 
argues that there exists the possibility of  instability  due to exchange-rate-oriented endogenous 
monetary policy. 
29. Since 1989, data on money  market transactions including reserves  and on the volume of 
operations by each instrument are published daily and monthly  (see table 2.5). Also see Nakao 
and Horii (1991). 59  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
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Reform of  the short-term money  market has progressed  since November 
1988. For example, overnight CP operations  and one-month TB operations 
were introduced. Since financial liberalization and globalization is still under 
way, market reform must proceed in order to maintain the efficacy of monetary 
policy. 
2.5  Concluding Remarks 
In  this  paper I have  discussed  (1) the structure of  the short-term money 
market in Japan, (2) the daily market operations of the Bank of Japan in this 
market, and (3) a possible theoretical interpretation of the role of such opera- 
tions in formulating market interest rates. 
The main points of the third issue are 
1. In principle, the Bank of Japan can control overnight rates by transmit- 
ting signals regarding the “anchor” rate (the overnight rate on the final day of 
the reserve maintenance period) to market participants. 
2. Since the span of  the reserve maintenance period in Japan is one month, 
however, market rates are formulated around the anchor rate expected by mar- 
ket participants, which does not necessarily reflect the exact intention of the 
Bank of Japan. 
3. Since the most crucial element in determining the overnight rate is the 
expectation of the anchor, the supply of  daily reserves itself is not necessarily 
important, except on the final day of the maintenance period. 
4. If the overnight rate is selected as the operating target, long-term interest 
rates can be used by the central bank as valuable economic indicators. 
Of couise, these conclusions are not without some reservations.  First,  re- 
garding the controllability  of  interest rates, I have argued that, in principle, 
the Bank of Japan can control the overnight rate. But if the bank tries to main- 
tain an inappropriate rate (e.g., an inflationary rate), the market may not be- 
lieve the signal, or the central bank may lose credibility in the market. In other 
words, the central bank cannot control interest rates as if  the rate of interest 
were a perfectly exogenous variable. 
Usually, central banks do not directly indicate the level of the target rate. 
This fact may partly be due to a concern over political pressure.  In addition, 
some theorists  have suggested  that the central bank  cannot transmit  signals 
that are too precise, because otherwise it would have an incentive to pursue a 
“time-inconsistent’’ policy.  30 
I believe that there is another reason why central banks are hesitant to quote 
the target rate directly. They tend to consider the process of pursuing monetary 
policy to be a dialogue between themselves and the market, and thus believe 
that interest rates should have an element of being endogenous. If this philos- 
ophy is extended too far, the system may become indeterminate; on the other 
30. See Stein (1989). for example. 61  Market Operations in Japan: Theory and Practice 
hand, if  controllability  of  interest rates is overemphasized, the actuality of 
market operations is lost. 
Second, the influence of international capital flows has been ignored in this 
paper. One justification  for this is that the topic of  this paper is mainly the 
determination of overnight rates.  Since exchange rate risk is large compared 
with the daily speculative return in the money market, it might not be unreal- 
istic to regard Japan’s money market as being effectively isolated from inter- 
national capital flows. 
However, this would not apply to a fixed exchange rate regime. Since inter- 
est rates are firmly linked by arbitrage, interest rate controllability by the cen- 
tral bank is restricted. By the same token, a perceived strong commitment to 
a target exchange rate restricts interest rate controllability. 
Also, the development of the Euromarket can be exploited to avoid domes- 
tic regulation, including reserve requirements. The latter problem is also im- 
portant  from the viewpoint of monitoring by the monetary authorities  and 
financial system stability. 
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